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EXECUTION OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED: A PUNISHMENT WITHOUT
JUSTIFICATION
PHILIP L. FETZER*
At the age of twenty-eight, Limmie Arthur does not know
the alphabet. He has the mental ability of a child ten to twelve
years old. After a recent court appearance Arthur was happy. He
did not understand that the judge had refused his plea for a new
trial or for a reduction of his sentence. He has been sentenced to
die in South Carolina's electric chair for the murder of his neigh-
bor.1 With an IQ of sixty-five, Limmie Arthur is mentally re-
tarded.2 Between April 1984 and August 1987, at least three peo-
ple like Limmie Arthur were executed.' What purposes are
served by executing people of very low intelligence?
Death penalty proponents have offered three reasons for ex-
ecuting those who perpetrate particularly heinous murders: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence; and (3) retribution. Because
none of these traditional justifications reasonably applies in the
cases of mentally retarded defendants, imposition of capital
* Associate Professor of Political Science, California Polytechnic State University.
A.B., 1965, Princeton University; M.A.T., 1970, Reed College; Ph.D., 1981, University of
Oregon.
1. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed Arthur's death sentence in No-
vember 1988. The court did not address any issues raised by imposition of the death
penalty against the mentally retarded. Instead, it held that Arthur had not voluntarily
waived his right to a jury trial during the sentencing phase of the proceedings against
him. See State v. Arthur, - S.C. -, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1988). Although Arthur's counsel
stated that Arthur had decided to waive his right to jury trial during sentencing, the
court held that such statements were insufficient to constitute a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right. See State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987). Before ac-
cepting a proffered jury trial waiver in a criminal proceeding, the court said that the trial
court must conduct "its own direct and independent interrogation of the defendant" to
ensure that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. See Arthur, - S.C. at -, 374 S.E.2d
at 294. On remand Arthur was sentenced to life.
2. See Marcus, Retarded Killer's Sentence Fuels Death Penalty Debate, Wash-
ington Post, June 22, 1987, at Al, col. 2. For a current definition of "mental retardation,"
see infra text accompanying notes 21-29. Arthur's IQ of sixty-five places him in the
"mildly retarded" category.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99.
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punishment against them should be prohibited as cruel and un-
usual within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
Execution affords society no more physical protection than
a life sentence without parole. Therefore, any execution based
on the first rationale constitutes an excessive punishment and is
"nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. '
Deterrence is based on the argument that potential criminal
offenders will weigh the costs and benefits of their crimes and
choose not to commit the offenses because of the punishment
that could result.' But how strong is the deterrence argument
when applied to people of Limmie Arthur's mental ability? Do
the mentally retarded weigh the consequences of their actions
before committing crimes? More importantly, do they have the
ability to foresee the likely consequences of their actions? Of
course, execution of the mentally retarded possibly might deter
others who suffer from no mental handicap from committing an
offense. One must wonder, however, whether society wishes to
sacrifice the mentally retarded offender for any increment of de-
terrence such an execution might bring.
Retribution is another critical justification for the death
penalty. Certain crimes arouse public emotion to such a degree
that vengeance seems appropriate. Nevertheless, does the retrib-
utive purpose apply equally to people of normal intelligence and
to those whose intellectual ability places them in the lowest
three percent of the population?8
This article is divided into four sections: (1) a brief histori-
cal and current review of the treatment of the mentally re-
tarded; (2) an examination of the interaction between mentally
retarded offenders and the criminal justice system; (3) an analy-
sis of the leading opinions on the rights of the mentally handi-
capped; and (4) arguments against execution of the mentally re-
tarded. To appreciate the argument against capital punishment
for the mentally handicapped, one must have some knowledge of
their past experience in society. One also must understand cur-
4. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
6. See W. BOWERS, LEoA HOMICmE 272-73(1984).
7. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (Stewart, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
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rent views about the retarded; otherwise, the characteristics that
distinguish retarded defendants from others accused of capital
crimes, making execution inappropriate in their cases, may be
lost.
The criminal justice system currently does not provide pro-
cedures specifically designed to protect the retarded. For exam-
ple, competency hearings, which exist to protect the rights of in-
dividuals who may be unable to assist in their own defense, are
held almost exclusively for mentally ill defendants. Such hear-
ings do not adequately address the legitimate needs of the men-
tally retarded. Even so, two recent federal decisions in civil
cases support extension of rights for the retarded into the crimi-
nal field.9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has issued opinions
on capital punishment that are relevant to the execution of the
mentally handicapped. 10 With an estimated 250 mentally handi-
capped convicts on death row," now is the time to examine the
argument against their prospective executions.
I. MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Before the turn of the century, little effort was made to dis-
tinguish between criminals, the mentally ill, and the mentally
retarded. 2 People with very low intellectual abilities commonly
were described as "idiots" or "imbeciles. 1 1 These labels, which
at first were technical references, became terms of derision that
are still used today. 4
9. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 115-
135.
10. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (execution of the insane violates
eighth amendment); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer cannot be pre-
cluded from considering any aspect of a defendant's character or record proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death).
11. See Marcus, supra note 2, at A4, col. 2 (estimates from a survey by the
Clearinghouse on Georgia Prisons and Jails).
12. See Santamour & West, The Mentally Retarded Offender: Presentation of
Facts and a Discussion of Issues in THE RETARDED OFFENDER 7 (1982).
13. 1 THE HisToRy OF MENTAL RETARDATION 13-16 (M. Rosen, G. Clark, & M. Kiv-
itz eds. 1976) [hereinafter HISTORY].
14. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th
Cir. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Even the court that
recognized the mentally handicapped people's reaction to derisive terminology referred
to "mental retardates" in its opinion. See id. at 197; see also Comment, We Have Met
1989]
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, society viewed
the mentally retarded as a menace to be controlled rather than
as a class of persons needing special treatment. Between 1907
and 1931 twenty-nine states adopted legislation to prevent men-
tally retarded people from procreating,15 and the Supreme Court
upheld "eugenic sterilization" laws. 6 During this period the
treatment of the mentally retarded was both demeaning and
hostile.
Justice Marshall recently described the treatment of men-
tally handicapped Americans in the first half of the century as a
"regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation" that
"in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the
worst excesses of Jim Crow." 7 Pejorative terms such as "feeble-
minded" and "moron" were still applied to the mentally re-
tarded in the 1920s.18 Eventually, however, attitudes did shift.
By the 1950s most experts agreed that no clear link existed be-
tween retardation and criminal behavior.19 With strong support
from both President Kennedy and President Johnson, the men-
tally handicapped began to receive significant, positive recogni-
tion for the first time.20
The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
the Imbeciles and They Are Us: The Courts and Citizens with Mental Retardation, 65
NEB. L. REv. 768, 770 n.7 (1986) ("Citizens with mental retardation and their advocates
react to these words in much the same way that blacks respond to the term 'nigger.' ").
15. See Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 414, 419 n.25 (1985).
16. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In upholding a eugenic sterilization stat-
ute, Justice Holmes said, "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . .Three generations
of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
17. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). See also Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197
(5th Cir. 1984) (the mentally retarded "have been subjected to a history of unfair and
often grotesque mistreatment").
18. See 2 HIsToRY, supra note 13, at 45.
19. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 420.
20. See Berkowitz, Mental Retardation: A Broad Overview in THE RETARDED OF-
FENDER 45 (1982). During the 1970s, Congress adopted numerous laws in support of the
rights of the mentally handicapped. See, e.g., Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6083 (West Supp. 1988)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
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defines mental retardation as "[significant] subaverage general
intelligence functioning resulting in or associated with concur-
rent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period."'21 The term "retarded" applies to
people with a measured IQ below sixty-eight on the Stanford-
Binet or below seventy on the Wechsler standardized tests22 who
do not demonstrate "age appropriate" behavior in a variety of
academic, social, interpersonal, and independent settings.2 3 Al-
though there are several conceptual approaches to retardation,
the developmental model is becoming more widely accepted. 24
The consensus is that people who are mentally handicapped are
capable of "growth, development and learning."
2 5
The measured scales for intelligence levels of the mentally





Profound 19 and below 24 and below2"
Although criticized for bias against members of minority groups,
the IQ scale is the most common dividing line between people
who are labeled mentally retarded and those who are not.2 7 The
21. Williams, The Right to Treatment for Developmentally Disabled Persons: Re-
assessment of An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 63 N.D.L. REv. 7 (1987) (quot-
ing the American Association on Mental Deficiency). The AAMD definition is widely
accepted. See Menninger, Mental Retardation and Criminal Responsibility: Some
Thoughts on the Idiocy Defense, 8 INr'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 343, 344 (1986). Some states
have adopted variants of the AAMD approach. For example, in Nebraska's community-
based mental retardation programs classification depends on ten factors that include
self-help skills, physical needs, and negative and positive behavior. See Comment, supra
note 14, at 798.
22. See N. NEISWORTH & R. SMITH, RETARDATION 57 (1978).
23. See id. at 27. As an example of the "age appropriate" concept, if the normal
twelve-year-old can successfully multiply two three-digit numbers, then the failure of a
twelve-year-old to succeed in the task indicates a delay in mathematical competence. See
id.
24. See id. at 8-9. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 n.40 (3d Cir. 1980).
25. N. NEISWORTH & R. SMITH, supra note 22, at 8.
26. Id. at 57. Cf. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 422-23; Menninger, supra
note 21, at 344.
27. See N. NEISWORTH & R. SMITH, supra note 22, at 29. Members of racial minori-
ties have argued that the tests are biased in favor of white, middle-class children and are
4231989]
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wide acceptance of IQ as a standard for mental handicap has
gained credibility because of the close correlations between
adaptive behavior and levels of measured intelligence.2" Most
schools employ the concept of subaverage intelligence and mal-
adaptive behavior in their classification schemes.2"
Given the normal distribution of intelligence, about three
percent of the people in a representative group can be expected
to have an IQ of less than seventy.30 Under the AAMD defini-
tion, about one percent of the national population is mentally
retarded. 1 The "mildly retarded" comprise nearly ninety per-
cent of the total mentally handicapped population.2
Mildly retarded children have the ability to learn academic
skills up to a sixth- or seventh-grade level.3 As adults, they usu-
ally are able to support themselves at a minimal level of subsis-
tence. 4 The mentally handicapped are disproportionately non-
white and from lower social classes and, despite their abilities,
suffer disproportionately from high rates of unemployment, in-
adequate housing conditions, and limited educational
experiences."
I. THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Although criminal behavior by mentally handicapped indi-
viduals does not appear to be greater than their percentage of
the general population,3" a disproportionate number of inmates
nationally are retarded.37 Most of the mentally handicapped who
not appropriate for children of other backgrounds. Additionally, the test for mental age
is "completely test defined and test-specific." Id. at 35.
28. See id. at 61.
29. See id. at 43.
30. See id. at 65. See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Williams, supra note 21, at 11.
31. See N. NEiswonH & R. SMITH, supra note 22, at 65.
32. See Williams, supra note 21, at 11.
33. See N. NEISWORTH & R. SMITH, supra note 22, at 171.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 44.
36. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 426 ("The best modern evidence sug-
gests that the incidence of criminal behavior among people with mental retardation does
not greatly exceed the incidence of criminal behavior among the population as a
whole.").
37. Santamour estimates that between three and five percent of the prison inmate
[Vol. 40
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are arrested fit into the "mildly retarded" category; criminal sus-
pects with IQs below fifty are relatively easy to identify and typ-
ically are diverted from the criminal justice system to state facil-
ities for the mentally retarded.3 8 Mildly retarded defendants,
however, face special difficulties in the criminal system. They
may wear a "'cloak of competence' that allows them to 'pass as
normal.' 3 Consequently, lawyers and judges frequently are un-
able to identify them as retarded. °
The retarded defendant is quite vulnerable to exploitation
by professionals. According to one survey, ninety-two percent of
mentally handicapped defendants never raised the issue of com-
petence to stand trial during the proceedings against them.4'
Furthermore, the retarded tend to confess more readily and
plead guilty more often than their nonhandicapped brethren.42
They also have greater difficulty in remembering details, locat-
ing witnesses, and testifying credibly in their own defenses. 43
Mentally handicapped defendants have other difficulties in
the legal system. Courts have noted that their susceptibility to
suggestions during interrogations,44 to extensive questioning,
5
and to threats and promises46 interferes with the defendants'
free and knowing exercise of their constitutional rights. The
mentally retarded defendants' limited abilities to exercise their
rights arguably leads to their disproportionate numbers on death
row in the United States.' 7
What procedural protections do exist to guard a defendant
population nationwide is mentally retarded. See Reid, Unknowing Punishment, 15 STU-
DENT LAW., May 1987, at 18.
38. See Santamour & West, supra note 12, at 11.
39. Menninger, supra note 21, at 354 (citing R. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPE-
TENCE (1967)).
40. See Ellis and Luckasson, supra note 15, at 493.
41. See Santamour & West, supra note 12, at 12.
42. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 445.
43. See Santamour & West, supra note 12, at 12.
44. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 n.8 (1980). Cf. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (interrogation after formal charges filed violates sixth
amendment right to counsel).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D.D.C. 1973).
47. See Marcus, supra note 2, at A4, col. 2. The estimated 250 individuals who are
mentally retarded represent more than thirteen percent of the 1,901 people on death row
in the United States. Of the national population, however, the retarded constitute only
about one percent. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
19891
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from exploitation may be of dubious value when the defendant
is mentally retarded. The usefulness of Miranda warnings, for
example, may be questioned. Miranda itself presupposes that an
individual, once apprised of his constitutional rights, will be able
to exercise them effectively."8 Yet given the propensity of men-
tally retarded defendants to confess to crimes or plead guilty,49
one must wonder whether Miranda offers them any meaningful
protection in the inherently coercive environment of custodial
interrogation. A Georgia federal district court recently ruled that
a defendant with an IQ of sixty-five who had been charged with
capital murder could not knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to remain silent without additional precautionary instruc-
tions.8 0 The court began its analysis by noting that "uncontra-
dicted evidence" demonstrated that the defendant had poor
reading and verbal comprehension skills and that his memory,
reasoning ability, and other skills necessary to make a voluntary
and intelligent waiver of his rights were severely impaired. 1
Under these circumstances, the court concluded, a mere recita-
tion of the Miranda warnings and a statement from the defend-
ant that he understood his rights and wished to waive them was
not sufficient to establish the waiver as knowing and voluntary:
The rationale for the Miranda decision was to put all
criminal defendants on equal (or nearly so) footing when decid-
ing whether to talk to the authorities before getting the advice
of a lawyer. Regardless of what one may think of Miranda, it is
the law and if it is to be read logically, it cannot say that all
defendants are equal when deciding whether or not they
should talk to a lawyer before confessing. Some defendants are
very intelligent and aware of all their rights, others are so lack-
ing in basic intelligence that they cannot possibly waive their
constitutional rights without additional precautionary
instructions."2
The point, of course, is not that mentally retarded persons
have rights that extend beyond those of citizens of average intel-
ligence. Instead, it is that the broad procedural safeguards re-
48. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 42.
50. See Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
51. See id. at 505.
52. Id. at 507.
[Vol. 40
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flected by Miranda simply are ineffective unless reasonably tai-
lored to the abilities of the individual suspect. The Supreme
Court itself has noted that mere recitation of warnings is insuffi-
cient to establish the voluntariness of a confession if the defend-
ant has limited mental abilities and is subjected to police
threats.5 3 In short, the mentally retarded defendants who enter
the criminal justice system stand in a different position from the
defendant of average intellectual ability. If those differences
have constitutional significance with respect to the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, they also may affect
other constitutional rights, including the eighth amendment pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishments.
Although the Supreme Court never has ruled on the consti-
tutionality of executing mentally retarded offenders, 4 it recently
held that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of those
who are insane at the time the sentence is to be carried out.55
Although there are differences between mental retardation and
mental illnesses such as insanity, the distinctions - if anything
- support a blanket prohibition on executions of the mentally
retarded.
While insanity is a form of mental illness that may be tem-
porary and can affect persons of all intellectual abilities,56
mental retardation is a permanent form of disability manifested
by persons of extremely low intelligence.5 Because of their low
53. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (per curiam). Sims testified that he
had been physically abused by a doctor who treated him after his arrest; the doctor
denied such abuse in his testimony, but was unable to testify that state patrolmen did
not abuse Sims. When he confessed, Sims had been in police custody for over eight
hours, deprived of food, and denied access to family, friends, or legal counsel. "He [was]
an illiterate, with only a third grade education, whose mental capacity [was] decidedly
limited. Under such circumstances the fact that the police may have warned [Sims] of
his right not to speak is of little significance." Id. at 407.
54. The Court has before it now the primary question raised by this article: the
constitutionality of executing mentally retarded offenders. The Fifth Circuit held that
the eighth amendment does not prohibit execution of the mentally retarded, and the
Court has agreed to review that decision. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 918 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). See also Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978,
984 (5th Cir. 1988); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 13 (1987). At least one state court also has considered and rejected the argument that
execution of a mentally retarded defendant violates the eighth amendment. See State v.
Middleton, 295 S.C. 318, 326, 368 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1988).
55. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
56. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 424 & n.53.
57. See id. at 424.
1989]
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intelligence, mentally retarded people are limited in their ability
to learn."8 On the other hand, mentally ill individuals are not
disabled learners. The fundamental distinction is that mental
retardation is not an illness subject to cure through counseling,
drugs, or therapy.59 Its outward characteristics may be modified
by education and training; nevertheless, the condition itself can-
not be eliminated by any means.
The criminal courts, however, have not provided procedural
guidelines that distinguish between mentally retarded and men-
tally ill defendants. The Supreme Court set forth the basic
framework for competency evaluations in Dusky v. United
States.6 In a brief, per curiam ruling the Court stated that the
"' test [for competence] must be whether [the accused] has suf-
ficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasona-
ble degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.' "81 Competency hearings typically are held when a
judge believes that a defendant "lacks the capacity to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own de-
fense."62 Mentally retarded defendants, however, receive little
protection under Dusky. Most competency inquiries generally
focus on psychological disabilities associated with mental illness,
not retardation."3 Expert witnesses called during competency
proceedings usually are not trained in mental retardation issues
and cannot provide reliable testimony about the competency of
a retarded defendant.6 4 Trial judges themselves are not experts
on retardation, and many do not accept the argument that retar-
dation may make a defendant incompetent to stand trial. 5
Several problems associated with competency hearings also
bear on the interaction of mentally handicapped defendants and
the criminal justice system in other areas. Even if qualified
mental health professionals are available to evaluate mentally
retarded defendants in all competency hearings, this does not
58. See id.
59. See id. & n.54.
60. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (adopting Solicitor General's proposal).
61. Id. at 402 (quoting Solicitor General's proposal).
62. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
63. See MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 3-32 (1983) [hereinafter OFFENDERS].
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solve the problem. For example, the fact that a person may not
be competent to stand trial does not necessarily relieve him of
criminal responsibility."6 The Dusky rule does not even address
the issue of responsibility; it is simply a functional rule that ap-
plies to the conduct or ability of defendants at their own trials.
In Drope v. Missouri1 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
difficulty of providing clear guidelines in competency proceed-
ings. The majority commented that there were "no fixed or im-
mutable signs" that would necessarily require lower courts to
conduct competency hearings every time." The logic of Drope
applies to the mentally ill since no current legal test assesses
competency in relation to retardation. 9
The M'Naghten rule, which focuses on the ability of the de-
fendant to tell the difference between right and wrong, is trig-
gered only when the question of sanity is raised by the defense."°
M'Naghten, therefore, addresses the issue of criminal responsi-
bility as opposed to the defendant's ability to function in his
own behalf in a legal proceeding. Nevertheless, mental retarda-
tion alone generally has been held insufficient to establish a de-
fense under the traditional M'Naghten rule."' The problem with
this approach is manifest. It equates the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong with full comprehension of the reasons
that certain conduct is morally and legally wrong. Current schol-
arship, however, casts doubt on such an equation. One leading
authority on mentally retarded offenders, Miles Santamour, sug-
gests that most mentally handicapped defendants will say that it
is wrong to steal, without understanding why it is wrong.
72
Perhaps because a number of mentally retarded defendants
66. See OFFENDERS, supra note 63, at 7.
67. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
68. Id. at 180.
69. See Santamour & West, supra note 12, at 14.
70. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843) ("[Tio establish a
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.").
71. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 672 P.2d 1175 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); West v. State,
617 P.2d 1362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (fact that defendant was retarded not enough
standing alone to establish viable defense under M'Naghten rule); see also Soskin, The
Mentally Retarded Offender: Competence, Culpability, and Sentencing in THE RE-
TARDED OFFENDER 209 (1982).
72. See Reid, supra note 37, at 21.
19891 429
11
Fetzer: Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without Justific
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fall through cracks in the M'Naghten rule, some states have
abandoned it. In 1978 the California Supreme Court overturned
a conviction of a fourteen-year-old with an IQ in the low for-
ties.78 The court rejected the M'Naghten test and, instead,
adopted the American Law Institute (ALI) approach to a de-
fense based upon "idiocy or mental retardation. 74 The court
viewed retardation as a "mental defect. '7 5 While the California
court acknowledged the difference between mental illness and
mental retardation, it recognized certain similarities as well. It
found that both conditions "impair the person's capacity to
commit crime. '7 6 The court ruled that "idiots" could not "enter-
tain general criminal intent" under California law.77 Other
courts, however, have not viewed retardation in the same light.78
The Supreme Court never has addressed the constitutional-
ity of punishing the mentally retarded for criminal conduct.
Matters of criminal culpability are largely concerns of state law.
Nevertheless, the types of punishments meted out by the states
to those convicted of crimes are of constitutional import, and in
this area, the Court has spoken forcefully.
In Ford v. Wainwright" the Court held that the eighth
amendment prohibits execution of the insane. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Marshall noted that English common law had
long prohibited execution of the insane.80 Furthermore, Marshall
stated, this rule has been adopted widely by the individual
states. Of the states that imposed capital punishment at the
73. See In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978).
74. Id. at 421-22, 584 P.2d at 526, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 389. According to the AlI test,
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id.
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(C)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
75. Id. at 422, 584 P.2d at 526, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
76. Id. at 422 n.6, 584 P.2d at 528 n.6, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 391 n.6.
77. See id. at 422, 584 P.2d at 527, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
78. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 220, 522 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1974)
(mental disorder less than insanity alone not enough to destroy capacity to premeditate
or to entertain requisite intent). A recent study indicates a relationship between differ-
ent levels of intelligence and certain types of crime. After controlling for socioeconomic
status and cultural and family background, the research suggested a correlation between
offenders of low intelligence and crimes of violence such as murder. See J. WILSON & R.
HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 165 (1985).
79. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
80. See id. at 406-08.
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EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED
time Ford was decided, twenty-six statutorily required that ex-
ecutions be stayed if the prisoner "meets the legal test for in-
competence.""s At least four others had adopted the English
common-law rule by judicial decision. 2 Still others used flexible
procedures to ensure that insane persons were not executed. s
Under these circumstances, and relying on society's "evolving
standards of decency,"' 4 the majority concluded that the execu-
tion of an insane person would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
While a majority of the Court agreed on the fundamental
question at issue in Ford, the Court was greatly divided over
whether the procedures used by the state of Florida and by the
lower federal courts on Ford's habeas corpus petition were con-
stitutionally permissible. Seven members of the Court agreed
that they were not, but no single opinion commanded a majority
of the Justices. In fact, the Court was so badly splintered on this
issue that two Justices, O'Connor and White, who dissented
from the majority's holding on the eighth amendment issue, nev-
ertheless would have returned the case to the state penal sys-
tem. 5 They reasoned that Florida's "positive law created a pro-
tected liberty interest in avoiding execution while
incompetent"8 6 and that the procedures used under the state
scheme did not comport with the requirements of the due pro-
cess clause.87
Ford did not purport to establish a constitutional standard
for insanity. Only Justice Powell offered any comment on what
constitutes insanity for eighth amendment purposes.88 He would
have held that the dictates of the eighth amendment are met if
state law prohibits the execution of those who "are unaware of
the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
suffer it." 9 This is precisely the standard required by the state
81. Id. at 408 n.2 (emphasis added).
82. See id. at 409 n.2.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).




88. See id. at 421-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
89. Id. at 422.
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law at issue in Ford.0 This verbal formulation differs little from
the standard used in Dusky for competence to stand trial.91 The
problem with such an approach has been outlined above.92
Recent history also underscores the inability of state courts
to ferret out mentally retarded offenders from the criminal jus-
tice system under a standard based on competency. Several
mentally retarded individuals have been executed in the last five
years. Arthur Goode III was thirty when he was electrocuted in
Florida in 1984.93 Shortly before he died, Goode stated that he
was "competent for execution. 9 4. He had been under medical
and psychiatric care from the time he was three;95 his IQ mea-
sured in the low sixties.96 The next year Virginia executed Mor-
ris Mason, who had been diagnosed as both paranoid schizo-
phrenic and mentally retarded with an IQ of sixty-six.9 7 The
defense attorney stated that Mason did not understand the na-
ture of his punishment.98 Finally, the day before the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Ford, Jerome Bowden was
electrocuted in Georgia.99 The Georgia Board of Pardons and
Paroles allowed the execution to continue, despite the fact that
Bowden had an IQ of sixty-five, because Bowden "had known
the difference between right and wrong" when he committed his
crime.100 In short, despite state procedures designed to ensure
that no incompetent persons are executed, 10' several persons of
90. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985) (requiring governor to stay executions of those
who "d[o] not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty
and why it is imposed" on them).
91. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
93. See Sex Slayer, Lovers' Lane Killer Executed, The Oregonian, April 6, 1984, at
A18, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. See Fishman, Virginia Man Looks for Justice With Execution of Son's Killer,
Washington Post, April 5, 1984, at A19, col. 4.
96. See supra note 93.
97. See Reid, supra note 37, at 23.
98. Id.
99. See Retarded Man, 33, Electrocuted as Plea to High Court Is Rejected, N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1986, at A16, col. 1.
100. See id.
101. When Goode and Bowden were executed, both Florida and Georgia had statu-
tory provisions requiring that executions of persons who were legally incompetent be
stayed. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-62(1982). Georgia has
since repealed its statute and replaced it with a different procedure. Under the new stat-
ute an applicant is entitled to an adversarial hearing when he alleges that he is "mentally
[Vol. 40432
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limited intellectual ability have been put to death.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE RIGHTS OF THE RETARDED
Despite the courts' failure to address the distinctive
problems of the mentally retarded in criminal cases, three im-
portant Supreme Court decisions in civil cases have affected the
rights of mentally handicapped people: (1) Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman;102 (2) Youngberg v. Romeo;
03
and (3) City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.0 4 The
first two rulings affected patients in a Pennsylvania institution
for the retarded; the third involved a Texas zoning ordinance
that restricted development of a group home for the retarded.
A. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
Pennhurst began as a class action by retarded residents of
the Pennhurst State School and Hospital in 1977.115 The district
court found that, in virtually every respect, the facility was of
inferior quality. Pennhurst was "grossly understaffed"; its pro-
grams were "inadequate"; its record keeping and drug practices
did not meet minimum standards; and its physical environment
was both physically and psychologically "hazardous."106
The court held that the only legitimate purposes for com-
mitment of the retarded was for "habilitation.' 10 7 In the absence
of such a purpose, the court concluded, the residents' due pro-
cess rights would be violated. 10 Since Pennhurst was not provid-
ing, and had failed to provide, habilitative treatment and was
incompetent to be executed." Section 17-10-60 defines such a person as one who is "pres-
ently unable to know why he or she is being punished and understand the nature of the
punishment." See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-60 to -71 (Supp. 1988). When Mason was
executed, Virginia had a flexible, discretionary procedure providing for the suspension of
sentence and transfer to mental facilities for those prisoners who had developed mental
illness. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177(1983).
102. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
103. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
104. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
105. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
106. Id. at 1303, 1305-08.
107. See id. at 1315-16. "Habilitation" refers to "that education, training, and care
required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development." Id. at 1298.
108. See id. at 1315-16.
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incapable of doing so in the future, the court ordered it closed.1"9
The court also held that "[o]nce admitted to a state facility, the
residents [had] a constitutional right to be provided with mini-
mally adequate habilitation under the least restrictive condi-
tions consistent with the purpose of the commitment."110 The
Third Circuit affirmed the district court order, with the excep-
tion of the school closing."' Instead of relying on constitutional
grounds, however, the court of appeals held that the conditions
at Pennhurst ran afoul of the rights of the retarded under the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of
1975.1 It did not reach the constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the De-
velopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act cre-
ated no substantive rights for the mentally handicapped;" 3 al-
though Congress intended the legislation to provide better care
for the retarded through funding incentives for the states, it did
not intend to give the mentally retarded new, judicially enforce-
able rights. 4
B. Youngberg v. Romeo
While Pennhurst was moving through the federal courts,
another suit was filed on behalf of a single resident of the same
institution." 5 Ruling in support of the right of a profoundly re-
tarded person to receive treatment and protection, the Third
Circuit noted that only three reasons justified involuntary civil
confinement of the mentally handicapped: (1) protection of soci-
ety; (2) protection of individuals unable to care for themselves;
109. See id. at 1327-28.
110. Id. at 1319.
111. See Pennhurst, 612 F.2d 84, 116 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane). The court noted the
novelty of legal rights for retarded individuals. "At a federal judicial level, we are asked
to interpret relatively new and innovative legislation and to embark upon unchartered
constitutional waters." Id. at 117. (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See also Romeo v. Youngberg,
644 F.2d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("The present controversy inhabits the twi-
light area of constitutional rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded.").
112. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6083
(West Supp. 1988)).
113. 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981).
114. See id. at 31. Three years later the Court held that the eleventh amendment
prohibited the district court from ordering Pennsylvania officials to conform Pennhurst's
practices to standards required by state law. See Pennhurst, 456 U.S. 89 (1984).
115. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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and (3) rehabilitation.116 In dicta the Youngberg court suggested
that the mentally retarded might deserve special judicial consid-
eration because of their social isolation and their "minimal im-
pact on the political process.
'117
On review the Supreme Court held for the first time that
the retarded did have substantive rights recognized by the Con-
stitution."' The fourteenth amendment, the Court stated, pro-
tects the rights of the involuntarily committed to: (1) safe condi-
tions; (2) freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints; and (3)
"minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and
freedom from undue restraint."'119
C. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
Two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg,
the Fifth Circuit held that an ordinance that effectively prohib-
ited the establishment of a group home for the retarded in a
Texas community violated the equal protection clause. 120 Judge
Goldberg, speaking for the court, concluded that mentally re-
tarded persons were members of a "'quasi-suspect' class"1'' and
deserved special consideration from the judiciary. That determi-
nation impelled the court to apply a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny to judge the validity of the law. Because it found that
the zoning ordinance did not "substantially further any impor-
tant governmental interests,' 1 22 the court held that the ordi-
nance violated the fourteenth amendment.
In ruling that the mentally retarded constituted a "quasi-
suspect class," the Fifth Circuit commented on their historical
116. See id. at 158.
117. Id. at 163 n.35 ("The mentally retarded may well be a paradigmatic example of
a 'discrete and insular minority'. ") (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
118. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
119. Id. at 315-16, 319.
120. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th
Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 1983; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985). Discrimination based on race, alienage, or national origin is viewed as
"suspect" because such "factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legiti-
mate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy ... [T]hese laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id.
122. 726 F.2d at 200.
1989] 435
17
Fetzer: Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without Justific
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
experience in the United States: "They have been subjected to a
history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment. Until the
1970s, they were universally denied admittance into public
schools. . . . Once-technical terms for various degrees of retar-
dation - e.g., 'idiots,' 'imbeciles,' 'morons,' - have become pop-
ular terms of derision."' 23 In addition the court noted a history
of widespread discrimination against the mentally retarded: they
lack political power because most states do not allow them to
vote. 2 " Furthermore, like race and gender, retardation is an im-
mutable characteristic.
The Supreme Court agreed that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, but did not accept the Fifth Circuit's position that
the retarded merited special judicial protection.125 Instead, the
Court concluded that the validity of the ordinance should be
judged under the more deferential rational basis standard. While
the Court specifically rejected the "quasi-suspect" status as-
signed to the mentally handicapped by the court of appeals, the
majority nevertheless concluded that the group home had not
been approved because of "an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded."' 28 Even though the Court recognized the
discriminatory nature of the statute, it limited its ruling to the
specific application of the ordinance.
2 7
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, concurred in the judgment but dissented from the applica-
tion of the rational basis test, arguing that the majority opinion
treated the mentally retarded with special regard even if it de-
nied doing so. 2 " This argument is quite persuasive. Under the
label of rational basis scrutiny, the majority engaged in the
searching inquiry into the application of the ordinance usually
reserved for ordinances that classify persons on the basis of gen-
der 29 or illegitimacy.130 More specifically, the majority rejected
123. Id at 197. See also supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text.
124. See id. A Texas law applies the historic prejudice to the retarded by denying
"idiots" the right to vote. See id. at 198 n.10.
125. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 442-47.
126. Id. at 450. Groups subject to irrational prejudice include racial minorities and
aliens. These groups receive special judicial recognition. See supra note 121.
127. See 473 U.S. at 447-50.
128. See id. at 455-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Kirch-
berg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding all-male draft
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as irrational the town's assertions that the location of the home
would arouse a negative attitude among nearby property own-
ers.1 31 It also rejected the town's argument that the home's loca-
tion near a junior high school would subject the retarded resi-
dents to harassment from students. The Court found this
argument lacking because some residents of the home actually
attended the school. 3 2 As Justice Marshall noted, this type of
searching inquiry was not the same rational basis test applied in
the Court's earlier equal protection cases. 133 Furthermore, in
Marshall's view, such heightened scrutiny was warranted. The
retarded, according to Marshall, have been subjected to state
laws that paralleled the worst excesses of Jim Crow. 34 The men-
tally retarded merited special judicial protection, he concluded,
because of that long history of discrimination.
3 5
By the mid-1980s, then, the Supreme Court had recognized
that the mentally retarded have a limited number of constitu-
tional rights guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, however, has not yet addressed the question of con-
stitutional rights for the mentally handicapped in the area of
criminal law.
IV. EXECUTION OF THE RETARDED AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence con-
sistently has recognized deterrence and retribution as the pri-
mary justifications for imposing the death penalty. 36 The fol-
lowing discussion challenges these justifications as applied to
cases involving the mentally retarded. Execution of mentally re-
registration); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California
statutory rape provision applying only to males).
130. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
131. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
132. See id. at 449.
133. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
134. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
135. See id. at 467.
136. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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tarded offenders fails to serve the purposes ostensibly promoted
by capital punishment for three reasons: (1) it has no demon-
strable deterrent value; 137 (2) it has minimal retributive benefit;
and (3) it is an excessive punishment. As such, execution of the
mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
A. Deterrence
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that statistical sup-
port for the deterrence argument is at best "inconclusive."' 38 In
former Chief Justice Burger's opinion, there is "an empirical
stalemate"'139 on the validity of deterrence. Despite the failure of
the states to produce concrete evidence supporting the deter-
rence rationale, a majority of the Court seems willing to defer to
legislative judgment on the matter. Under this view, a rule of
constitutional law that shifts the burden to state legislatures to
produce statistical evidence in support of the deterrence ration-
ale simply "provide[s] an illusory solution to an enormously
complex problem."'" Deterrence, therefore, must be recognized
as a legitimate penal objective of the state in imposing the death
penalty. Additionally, any argument positing that the mentally
retarded should not be subject to capital punishment clearly
cannot proceed as a frontal assault on the deterrence rationale.
Instead, one must explain why the deterrence justification has
little logical relevance in determining whether execution of the
mentally retarded is constitutional.
First, the deterrence argument is weakened by the fact that
few criminal homicides result in execution. For example, be-
tween 1930 and 1982, no more than two percent of first-degree
murder cases have ended with the imposition of the death pen-
alty on the perpetrators.'' Since the logic of deterrence assumes
that potential murderers make rational calculations prior to act-
ing, the remote possibility of being executed likely will receive
only minimal consideration in the mind of the rational mur-
137. See id. at 183.
138. Id. at 184.
139. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 395 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 396.
141. See W. BOWERS, supra note 6, at 273.
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derer. The likelihood that a mentally retarded individual will be
deterred under the conditions described above is even more
remote.
In 1982 the Supreme Court concluded that the deterrent ef-
fect of capital punishment was likely to apply "only when mur-
der is the result of premeditation and deliberation."142 Four
years later Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist stated, "[T]he death penalty has
little deterrent force against defendants who have [a] reduced
capacity for considered choice."14 Deterrence, therefore, rests
on the assumption that the rational actor will conform his con-
duct to a socially acceptable standard because the potential
costs of unacceptable activities outweigh the potential benefits.
This assumption, however, has little validity when applied to
mentally retarded offenders. Mentally retarded individuals often
have poor impulse control.14 4 Furthermore, most mentally re-
tarded individuals have incomplete or underdeveloped concepts
of moral blameworthiness and causation. 145 They are, therefore,
frequently unable to distinguish between events that result from
morally blameworthy behavior and those that do not. This im-
pairs their abilities to understand that certain consequences flow
directly from particular acts.146
The failure of mentally retarded persons to demonstrate
"age appropriate" behavior in a variety of settings also bears on
the deterrence justification for the death penalty.147 In Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma14s the Supreme Court ruled that the eighth
amendment prohibits a state from executing a convicted first-
degree murderer who was only fifteen years old at the time he
committed the crime. Four members of the Court concluded
that deterrence is an "unacceptable" rationale when applied to
"such young offender[s]. ' ' 9 Speaking for the plurality, Justice
142. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Fisher v. United States,
328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
143. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
144. See AmRICAN AsS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETrAR-
DATION 16 (1983) [hereinafter AAMD].
145. See Boehm, Moral Judgment: Cultural and Subcultural Comparison, 1 INT'L
J. PSYCHOLOGY 143, 149-50 (1966).
146. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 15, at 430.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
148. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
149. Id. at 2700 (plurality opinion). Justices Stevens, Blackman, Brennan, and Mar-
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Stevens stated, "The likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight
to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually non-
existent."'150 Such reasoning logically cannot be limited only to
persons whose biological age is less than sixteen years; it applies
equally to persons whose mental age is under sixteen. Justice
Stevens arguably included the mentally retarded along with chil-
dren among "those whose status renders them unable to exercise
choice freely and rationally." '151 If mentally retarded offenders
are no more able than a teenage offender to "exercise choice
freely and rationally," then the deterrence rationale is equally
"unacceptable" when applied to them.
B. Retribution
Retribution is perhaps the most consistently stated ration-
ale for capital punishment. While it may not be the "dominant
objective of the criminal law,"' 52 the Supreme Court has made
clear that it is neither a "forbidden state objective nor one in-
consistent with our respect for the dignity of men."' 53 Retribu-
tion has two components. First, the death penalty punishes the
condemned for conduct that is so egregious, so violative of so-
cially acceptable standards of behavior, that it merits the sever-
est of penalties. In common parlance, convicted murderers "de-
serve" to die for some particularly heinous crimes. Second, the
death penalty expresses "society's moral outrage at particularly
offensive conduct.' 54 Execution of the mentally retarded, how-
shall comprised the plurality. They would have held the death penalty unconstitutional
for all offenders who were under age sixteen when they committed capital offenses. See
id. at 2696, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment. She expressed agreement in
principle with the plurality, id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), but
determined that such a bright-line rule should not be adopted until a substantial major-
ity of state legislatures had addressed the matter. See id. at 2707. Justice Kennedy took
no part in consideration of the case.
150. Id. at 2700.
151. Id. at 2693 n.23 ("Children, the insane, and those who are irreversibly ill with
the loss of brain function ..... all retain 'rights' . . . , but often such rights are.
exercised by agents acting with the best interests of their principals in mind.").
152. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
153. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, J., announcing the judg-
ment of the Court).
154. Id. See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (death penalty
ultimately understood only as expression of community's outrage). Not all Justices ac-
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ever, serves neither of these retributive components.
Retribution rests upon a foundation of moral responsibility.
The more one can be held morally responsible for his actions,
the greater the strength of the retribution theory. Even so, the
converse also would appear to be correct. This fact has not been
lost on the Supreme Court. In a number of death penalty deci-
sions, the Court has directed attention to the defendant's degree
of culpability or moral guilt. Nearly a century ago the Court re-
versed the sentence in a capital case because the accused did not
have the mental capacity that would render him criminally re-
sponsible for his actions.155 The defendant was not insane, but
he was considered to be "weak minded. '156 In 1982 the Court
vacated the death sentence of a person who was sixteen years
old at the time he committed a capital murder because the trial
judge had not taken sufficient notice of the youth's back-
ground.1 57 The Court noted that the defendant's "mental and
emotional development were at a level several years below his
chronological age."1 58 It also added that "youth is more than a
chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a per-
son may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage." '59
This is not, of course, to minimize the seriousness of the
offense, even when committed by a juvenile or person of dimin-
ished intellectual capacity. It is, however, recognition that
"'[c]rimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to vic-
tims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less
punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to con-
trol their conduct and to think in long-range terms than
adults.' "1160 Similarly, the mentally retarded deserve less punish-
ment because they have less capacity to control their conduct
cept the retribution argument. Justice Marshall, who believes the death penalty is un-
constitutional in all cases, commented in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that
"[t]o preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently deni-
grated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment." Id. at 344 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
155. See United States v. Davis, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
156. See id. at 475.
157. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
158. Id. at 116.
159. Id. at 115.
160. Id. at 115 n.11 (quoting TwENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POL-
icy TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
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and to think in long-range terms. 6' Several state supreme courts
also have reached this conclusion, recognizing that mentally re-
tarded defendants have a lesser degree of culpability in capital
cases than do defendants of normal intelligence.'62
The second component of retribution, expression of societal
outrage, also fails to provide a justification for execution of the
mentally retarded. As a preliminary matter, one must question
whether capital punishment in any case actually vents any social
anger. Justice Byron White has noted that "when imposition of
the [death] penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it
would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retri-
bution would measurably satisfied."'' 3 Yet since the Supreme
Court rejected an argument that the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional in all cases,6 thousands of people have been mur-
dered. 165 Only ninety persons, however, had been executed
through September 1987. Clearly, any generalized need to exe-
cute those who "deserve" to die is not being met.
That failure to serve a general societal need for retribution
also underlies the two most relevant Supreme Court cases affect-
ing the constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally re-
tarded offenders. In Ford v. Wainwright 6 the Supreme Court
held that execution of the insane violates the eighth amend-
ment. Wainwright is interesting because the defendant was not
mentally impaired either when he committed the crime or when
he was tried and sentenced. Only after he had been condemned
did he begin suffering from mental disorders.1 7 Speaking for the
161. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 456 So. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 1984) (vacating death
sentence of defendant with IQ "between 50 and 70"); State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 475,
146 P.2d 338, 343 (1944) (death sentence vacated because person with "a pronounced
subnormal mind [should not] be held to the same high degree of accountability" as a
person of normal intelligence); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N.W.2d 918, 927
(1964) (death sentence reduced to life for a "high-grade imbecile" with an IQ of sixty-
four); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987) (vacating death sentence for
defendant with IQ of sixty-three).
163. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
164. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
165. For example, in 1979 alone, an estimated 20,000 murders were committed in
the United States. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 48 (1982).
166. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
167. See id. at 401-02. Cf. In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 431, 584 P.2d 524, 532,
149 Cal. Rptr. 387, 395 (1978) (reversing misdemeanor conviction of a fourteen-year-old
with an IQ between forty and forty-two because his "extremely low intelligence, his in-
[Vol. 40
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majority, Justice Marshall questioned the "retributive value of
executing a person who no comprehension of why he has been
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life." 1 8 He
also stated that societal outrage could not justify execution of
the insane because of "the natural abhorrence civilized societies
feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his
own conscience or deity." 169 As noted above, the mentally re-
tarded offender condemned to die has no grasp or appreciation
of the causal connection between his actions and his punish-
ment.17 0 In fact, in another context the Court has recognized
that the mentally retarded "have a reduced ability to cope with
and function in the everyday world."'' Following Justice Mar-
shall's logic, then, one reasonably may question the retributive
value of capital punishment for the person of extremely low
intelligence.
Thompson v. Oklahoma172 also supports such a conclusion.
In Thompson four members of the Court concluded that a fif-
teen-year-old "is not capable of acting with the degree of culpa-
bility that can justify the ultimate penalty.' ' 73 The underlying
rationale of the Thompson plurality, that young people have a
lesser degree of responsibility for their actions, applies with
equal strength to the actions of the mentally retarded:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make
the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or
her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt
to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privi-
leges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their ir-
responsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult. 7
4
Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the
ability to engage in abstract reasoning, and his suggestibility present a picture of some-
one who lacks the capacity to prefer ... obedience to law over the malign urgings of his
companions").
168. 477 U.S. at 409.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
171. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
172. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
173. See id. at 2692.
174. Id. at 2699.
1989] 443
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Thompson plurality concluded that the death penalty, even as
an expression of social outrage at particularly offensive conduct,
could not justify the execution of a fifteen-year-old defendant., 5
Because the mentally retarded offender generally has the intel-
lectual ability of a pre-adolescent, the reasoning of the Thomp-
son plurality cannot be limited strictly to juvenile offenders. It
also must apply to those persons, no matter what their biological
ages, who suffer from impaired intellectual functioning that sig-
nificantly limits their effectiveness "in meeting standards of
maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social re-





Without a retributive function, capital punishment lacks a
broad, concrete legal justification. As Justice Stevens recently
stated, "In the context of capital felony cases, therefore the
question whether the death sentence is an appropriate,
nonexcessive response to the particular facts of the case will de-
pend on the retributive justification."'17 7 Because the retributive
rationale is weaker when applied to the mentally retarded than
to the nonhandicapped, capital punishment is more likely to be
an excessive response to a murder committed by a mentally re-
tarded individual than to one committed by a person of normal
intelligence.
C. Excessive Punishment
Absent any deterrent or retributive justification, execution
of the mentally retarded is cruel within the meaning of the
eighth amendment because it is excessive. Speaking for four
members of the Court in Coker v. Georgia, 8 Justice White in-
cluded in his interpretation of "excessive" any capital sentence
that "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment.' 7 19 Since the mentally retarded do not have the
mental capacity to be deterred, it is a "purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering"' 80 when people of extremely
175. See id.
176. AAMD, supra note 143, at 11.
177. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 480.
178. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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low intelligence are involved.
Additionally, the death penalty for the mentally retarded is
excessive because it is out of proportion to the crime. Because of
the lesser "moral guilt" associated with a crime committed by
someone with an IQ less than seventy, applying the same pun-
ishment to that person as to one of normal intellectual ability
makes the punishment disproportionate. In striking down a
Louisiana statute that provided for a mandatory death penalty
for certain offenses, Justice Stevens noted that judicial distinc-
tions must be made between offenders with differing back-
grounds because society has rejected the belief that "'every of-
fense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular of-
fender.' "181 The past lives and habits of mentally retarded indi-
viduals are sufficiently distinct that they deserve a distinctive
judicial response in capital cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In a 1986 lecture Justice Brennan remarked that "[ilt seems
fair to say that we simply cannot know exactly or with certitude
what punishments the Framers thought were cruel and un-
usual." '182 The question of whether execution of the mentally
handicapped is cruel within the meaning of the eighth amend-
ment has increased significance for the estimated 250 residents
of death row in that category. The unique difficulty for retarded
offenders in a capital case can be understood more readily when
one recognizes that little is known about them. Because igno-
rance about the retarded is widespread within the judicial sys-
tem, they frequently have been victims of inappropriate
action."' 3
181. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (quoting Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
182. Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from
the Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 313, 323 (1986).
183. See Ravenel & Atkinson, Introduction: Why This Text? in THE RETARDED OF-
FENDER 1 (1982). "Ignorance regarding the nature of handicapping conditions, ignorance
of the existence of services, ignorance of the need for special programs for handicapped
offenders, and inability to recognize behavior that signals a need for special evaluation of
an accused have been found nationwide. The problem exists in every jurisdiction in the




Fetzer: Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without Justific
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Execution of anyone who is mentally retarded is indefen-
sible. It is indefensible because it is applied without discrimina-
tion, in the best sense of the word, to a class of offenders who
differ in important and identifiable respects from all other of-
fenders. The death penalty must be imposed through a system
that "can rationally distinguish between those individuals for
whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is
not.' 184 Applying a death sentence to anyone who functions at
the mental level of a pre-adolescent child does not rationally dis-
tinguish those for whom execution is a legitimate punishment
from those for whom it is not. State governments recognize the
need for a separate criminal justice system for juveniles. The ar-
gument for alternate legal treatment for the mentally handi-
capped in a capital case is at least as compelling.
Execution of the mentally handicapped also makes no mea-
surable contribution to the accepted goals of capital punish-
ment. The main legal objectives that may make the death pen-
alty legitimate in some circumstances apply with considerably
less force when directed toward the mentally retarded. The de-
terrence argument is, at best, an "empirical stalemate."'185 It has
even less validity for defendants who have a reduced sense of
responsibility about the seriousness of their actions and the con-
sequences of their choices. 8 6 Likewise, retribution is less appro-
priate when a retarded offender is involved. A person with a re-
duced capacity to understand the implications of his acts should
receive a lesser punishment than the individual who is capable
of recognizing the full consequences of what he has done.
There are ways of reducing the problem confronting the
courts in capital cases with mentally retarded defendants. First,
a mental health professional trained to evaluate the mentally re-
tarded should be appointed by the court and be available to tes-
tify for the defendant at each preliminary hearing in a capital
case about the presence or absence of retardation. The cost of
such a procedure would have to be weighed against the fact that
more than thirteen percent of the prisoners on death row in the
United States are mentally retarded. 8 7 Second, a finding of
184. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1977).
185. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 395 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
187. See supra note 47.
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mental retardation by the mental health professional could be
submitted by defense counsel for the trial court's consideration
at any competency hearing. This option would allow the re-
tarded defendant significantly greater opportunity to receive ap-
propriate treatment in a capital case. Finally, a finding of
mental retardation would result in a conclusive presumption for
life rather than execution at the sentencing phase of the trial
More than sixty years ago Benjamin Cardozo wrote, "The final
cause of the law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its
aim cannot permanently justify its own existence."' " Execution
of the mentally retarded violates that precept because it does
not substantially further social welfare. The rule allowing the
death penalty to be applied against the retarded has missed its
aim. It can be justified no longer.
188. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921). "Logic and his-
tory have their place. We will shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only
within bounds. The end which the law serves will dominate them all." Id.
19891
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